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Cognitive Spread:  
Under What Conditions Does the Mind 
Extend Beyond the Body? 
Zed Adams and Chauncey Maher 
 
Abstract: The extended mind hypothesis (EMH) is the claim that the mind can 
and does extend beyond the human body. Adams and Aizawa (A&A) contend that 
arguments for EMH commit a ‘coupling constitution fallacy’. We deny that the 
master argument for EMH commits such a fallacy. But we think that there is an 
important question lurking behind A&A’s allegation: under what conditions is 
cognition spread across a tightly coupled system? Building on some suggestions 
from Haugeland, we contend that the system must exhibit a distinctive sort of 
semantic activity, semantic activity that the system as a whole takes responsibility 
for. 
 
 
‘An individual’s being responsible is its taking over responsibility for its whole self’.  
      —John Haugeland (2000: 65) 
 
1. Introduction 
 Many of us have a peculiarly intimate relationship with our iPhones. We 
bring them everywhere, all the time, and they play an essential role in how we 
navigate our environment, communicate with others, remember our experiences, 
and plan for the future.  
This and examples like it have been taken by many philosophers and 
cognitive scientists to illustrate the extended mind hypothesis (hereafter EMH).
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According to EMH, the human mind is a tightly coupled system that extends 
beyond the human body to include external, worldly things, such as our iPhones. 
Many people are unmoved by such examples.
2
 Fred Adams and Ken 
Aizawa (hereafter A&A) allege that not all coupling is constitution; to think 
otherwise is to commit the ‘coupling-constitution fallacy’.3  
In this essay, we explain why the master argument for EMH does not 
commit such a fallacy.
4
 But we admit that there is an important question lurking 
behind A&A’s allegation: under what conditions is cognition spread across a 
tightly coupled system? Building on some suggestions from John Haugeland, one 
of the originators of EMH, we contend that the system must exhibit a distinctive 
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sort of ‘semantic activity’, semantic activity that the system as a whole takes 
responsibility for.
5
 
 In §2.1, we sketch the master argument for EMH. In §2.2, we present and 
undermine the allegation that the master argument commits the ‘coupling-
constitution fallacy’, explaining what might have led A&A astray. In §3, we 
observe that, nevertheless, one should like to know when cognition is spread 
across a tightly coupled system. In §§3.1-3.3, we sketch a controversial answer, 
explaining that the system must engage in a distinctive sort of self-criticism. 
 
2. EMH and the Coupling-Constitution Fallacy 
 
2.1. The Argument for the Extended Mind Hypothesis 
In this section, we summarize the master argument for EMH, as it 
originated with Haugeland (1995) and was developed by Andy Clark and David 
Chalmers (1998).
6
  
When arguing for EMH, the main burden is to show that external items are 
genuine constituents of a cognitive process, not merely causal influences on it. 
The distinction between constituents and causal influences on a process is 
difficult to formulate in general terms, but is easy to illustrate with examples. 
Consider the case of playing a game of chess: the chessboard and pieces are 
constituents in this process; the pizza eaten while playing is merely a causal 
influence on it (e.g., if it provides the energy necessary for moving the pieces). 
There is a relationship of dependence in both cases—between a process and its 
constituents and a process and its causal influences—but it is a different sort of 
dependence in each case. The causal influences on a process play a role in 
bringing it about; the constituents make it what it is.
7
 
Haugeland focuses on a case of navigation. How does a normal person 
find her way from Berkeley to San Jose, California? Here is his wonderfully terse 
account of how he finds the way: ‘I pick the right road (Interstate 880 south), stay 
on it, and get off at the end’ (1995: 234). Haugeland claims that the road should 
count as part of the cognitive system responsible for finding the way. By this, he 
does not mean that the road is a mere cognitive aid—something external to his 
mind but which his mind uses to help find the way. Rather, he means that he and 
the road form a single cognitive system. 
To make his case, drawing upon principles of systems analysis first 
articulated by Herbert Simon, Haugeland distinguishes between high- and low-
bandwidth interaction. He points out that spatial contiguity is not a good way to 
identify the components of a system. For instance, in many universities, the 
offices of the philosophy department are spread throughout the campus, across 
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different buildings. Offices need not be contiguous in order to be a component of 
a university, such as a department. A much better way to identify the components 
of a university is to look at the nature of the interaction between offices, 
regardless of their contiguity. Certain offices interact in an intense, tightly-
coupled manner (through meetings, email, etc.), thereby functioning as part of a 
relatively independent and self-contained component of the university as a whole. 
Other offices interact less intensely: they simplify the products of their work and 
exchange these simplified reports with each other. High-bandwidth interaction is 
intra-component interaction; it is what goes on within a part of a system. Low-
bandwidth interaction is inter-component interaction; it is what goes on between 
parts of a system. A job hire meeting, in which the members of a department work 
together to decide who to hire, is an example of the sort of intense, tightly coupled 
interaction that is characteristic of high-bandwidth interaction; reporting to the 
dean’s office about the results of such a meeting is the kind of simplified 
interaction that is characteristic of low-bandwidth interaction.  
Haugeland argues that when he finds his way to San Jose, he is in a high-
bandwidth interaction with the road. In this respect, the road functions just as an 
inner mental representation of the way to San Jose would function.
8
 On those 
grounds, Haugeland claims that the road itself should count as part of the 
cognitive system. In his words:  
 
[M]uch as an internal map or program, learned and stored in memory, would … 
have to be deemed part of an intelligent system that used it to get to San Jose, so 
I suggest the road should be considered integral to my ability. (1995: 234) 
 
Thus, Haugeland thinks that the mind extends well beyond the central nervous 
system.
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Clark and Chalmers (C&C) make a similar argument. They focus on a 
case of memory, asking us to imagine Otto, an Alzheimer’s patient who 
remembers where the Museum of Modern Art is by writing down its address in a 
notebook. There are four crucial features of Otto’s interaction with his notebook: 
(i) Otto always carries the notebook with him; (ii) the notebook itself is easy to 
access; (iii) Otto automatically endorses whatever he reads in it; (iv) Otto only 
writes things in it that he has explicitly endorsed in the past. Taken together, these 
four features imply that this is an example of high-bandwidth interaction. Given 
this, C&C argue that the contents of the notebook—e.g., MOMA’s address—are 
functionally equivalent to stored mental representations (i.e., memories). If 
memories are part of Otto’s mind, then so too are the contents of the notebook. 
C&C offer the following principle by which they arrive at this conclusion: 
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If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, 
were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of 
the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the 
cognitive process. (1998: 222) 
 
Since the contents of the notebook are part of Otto’s mind, his mind extends 
beyond his body. 
 It is important to see that Haugeland’s and C&C’s arguments share a 
structure. They argue that the mind extends because there are external items (a 
road, a notebook) that are functionally equivalent to admitted parts of the mind (a 
map, a memory). And these external items are functionally equivalent to parts of 
the mind because the external items have the same high-bandwidth interactions 
that those parts of the mind have to other parts of the mind.  
Schematically, here is the master argument for EMH: 
1. Y is part of a cognitive system Z. 
2. X (an external item) has the same high-bandwidth interaction with other 
parts of Z that Y has. 
3. So, X is functionally equivalent to Y. 
4. So, X is part of Z. 
 
 
2.2. The Coupling-Constitution Fallacy 
 In a series of publications, Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa have insisted that 
not all coupling is constitution. They allege that proponents of EMH tend to 
commit a ‘coupling-constitution fallacy’, the mistake of thinking that because 
something is coupled to a mind, it must be part of that mind. Here is their 
schematic account of this fallacy: 
 
 The coupling-constitution fallacy:  
 X is coupled to Y. 
 So, X is a part of Y.
10
 
 
 This pattern of inference is obviously fallacious, whether the topic is 
minds or anything else. Counter-examples abound. A&A point out that ‘the 
neurons leading into a neuromuscular junction are coupled to the muscles they 
innervate, but the neurons are not a part of the muscles they innervate’ (2010: 68) 
but there are countless such counter-examples. Consider the classic example of a 
tightly coupled system, Watt’s steam engine governor.11 
 5 
 
12
 
In this tightly coupled system, the spinning weights (on the left) are tightly 
coupled to the throttle valve (on the right), but that does not imply that the 
spinning weights are part of the throttle valve. 
 The ease with which one can come up with such counter-examples 
suggests that it is not a plausible characterization of anything anyone actually 
thinks.
13
  
 Indeed, the coupling-constitution fallacy simply is not an accurate 
representation of the master argument for EMH. Specifically, it does not 
accurately represent the role coupling or high-bandwidth interaction plays in that 
argument. (In what follows, we will use ‘coupling’ and ‘high-bandwidth 
interaction’ and their cognates interchangeably.) 
 First, nowhere does the master argument claim or imply that if X is 
coupled to Y, then X is part of Y. Haugeland, for instance, does not claim that 
since the road to San Jose is tightly coupled to him it becomes part of him. Rather, 
he claims that the he and the road together make up a coupled cognitive system. 
Schematically, here is Haugeland’s actual claim: 
 
X is coupled to Y. 
So, X and Y make up Z. 
 
The idea is that when two things are tightly coupled, they constitute some third 
thing, of which they are both parts. A&A do not seem to recognize that.  
 Second, while the master argument for EMH certainly appeals to coupling, 
it is not merely an argument from coupling. As we saw, Haugeland argues that the 
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road is functionally equivalent to an ‘internal map or program’ because it has the 
same kind of high-bandwidth interaction with him that an ‘internal map or 
program’ would have. Because the road is functionally equivalent to an admitted 
part of a mind, it is part of a mind. Thus, coupling is only one step in the 
argument for EMH. Recall our schematization of the master argument: 
1. Y is part of a cognitive system Z. 
2. X (an external item) has the same high-bandwidth interactions with the rest 
of Z that Y has. 
3. So, X is functionally equivalent to Y. 
4. So, X is part of Z.14 
 Thus, A&A misconstrue the place of coupling in the master argument for 
EMH. Having gotten clear about its place in the argument, it is not obvious that 
the argument as a whole is fallacious. Indeed, the argument looks plausible. 
Two questions naturally arise at this point. First, what explains A&A’s 
misconstrual of the argument for EMH? Second, is there anything left of A&A’s 
worries? 
 A preliminary explanation for A&A’s misconstrual is that they seem to 
conflate coupling with (mere) causal interaction. This is evident in the examples 
of ‘coupling’ that they themselves introduce to the discussion. For instance, they 
suggest that Clark holds that a pencil thinks simply because it is ‘coupled’ to a 
mathematician who uses it to write the equation ‘2+2=4’.15 A&A contend that in 
this case the mind obviously does not extend, so Clark is wrong about what it 
takes for the mind to extend.  
 However, Clark and other defenders of EMH would (or should) simply 
agree that in this case the mind does not extend. It does not extend because the 
pencil (and paper) play no constitutive role in calculating the answer to this 
equation. More importantly, and more precisely, cognition does not extend to the 
pencil because it is not coupled to the relevant parts of the mathematician in her 
act of calculating. Although the mathematician certainly uses the pencil to write 
the equation, there is no good reason to think that what she writes is the result of 
this interaction. Rather, the mathematician first computes the answer to the 
equation in her head and only then records this answer on the paper. The pencil 
and paper are simply instruments for recording the result of a process completed 
elsewhere. Writing ‘2+2’ is not part of computing the answer to the equation. By 
contrast, consider a case of multi-digit multiplication: ‘49885320 x 12534959 = 
625310440901880’. When one uses a pencil, paper, and a long-multiplication 
algorithm to compute the answer to that equation, writing plays a constitutive role 
in the process of figuring out the answer, since the position of the numerals that 
one writes on the paper are part of how one arrives at the solution to the 
equation.
16
 A&A’s example of writing ‘2+2=4’ is fundamentally unlike this, for 
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the position of the numerals written on the paper does not play a role in 
computing the answer to the equation at all; we can explain what the 
mathematician is thinking and why she is thinking it without making any 
reference to the pencil and paper whatsoever. A&A’s example is thus more like 
the way in which written mathematical notation was used in the ancient world, in 
that ‘[a]ll sizable calculations in the ancient world were performed with the aid of 
some kind of abacus; a written number representation was needed for record 
purposes only’ (Hollingdale and Tootill, 1965: 21). Thus, A&A seem to treat a 
case of (mere) causal interaction as a case of coupling.   
 There is a deeper explanation for A&A’s misconstrual, however. To see 
this, it will help to talk of embedded and unembedded bodies. Focus on 
Haugeland’s trip to San Jose. In the actual case, his body is embedded, for it is 
tightly coupled with the road. To be embedded with something is to be coupled to 
it. It is possible, however, to imagine a counter-factual case in which he has an 
inner mental representation of the route to San Jose. Imagine, for instance, that 
Haugeland is able to find the way to San Jose by memorizing the number of steps 
and turns that he must take in order to get there from a certain starting point. In 
this imaginary case, his body would be unembedded, for although his body would 
be causally interacting with the road, it would not be coupled with it. Strictly 
speaking, in this imaginary case, the road does not play any cognitive role 
whatsoever in Haugeland’s finding his way to San Jose.  
Now, advocates of EMH take the actual case to be fundamentally different 
from the imaginary case. A&A, however, would see the cases as fundamentally 
similar. Because they conflate coupling with mere causal interaction, they would 
emphasize a superficial similarity between the embedded and unembedded cases: 
in both, Haugeland’s body causally interacts with the road. For A&A, this 
similarity suggests that whatever cognitive capacities explain his behavior in the 
imaginary case, they must also explain it in the actual case. In other words, they 
would assume that since in the imaginary case his body functions as a self-
contained cognitive system, it must function similarly in the actual case. But this 
assumption is a mistake, and the superficial similarity it rests upon is deeply 
misleading. Although Haugeland’s body causally interacts with the road in both 
cases, the functional role of his body is fundamentally different in them: in the 
imaginary case, his body is unembedded; in the actual case, his body is 
embedded. 
In short, by conflating causal interaction and coupling, A&A appear to 
hold that the cognitive capacities of unembedded bodies are just the same as the 
cognitive capacities of embedded bodies. But this is precisely the assumption that 
the master argument for EMH is designed to put in doubt. A&A’s mistake is to 
assume that the parts and wholes of cognitive systems are fixed by how they 
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sometimes function. That is, they assume that because Haugeland himself 
sometimes functions as a self-contained cognitive system, he must always 
function as such.
17
 The case of the road to San Jose is designed as a counter-
example to precisely that inference. A&A, therefore, are themselves guilty of a 
fallacy, that of assuming that because something sometimes functions in a certain 
way, it must always function in that way. We might call it the functional fixedness 
fallacy. When Haugeland is finding the way to San Jose, he is only part of a larger 
cognitive system, one that contains the road as well. 
 
3. Giving a Damn 
Having diagnosed the sources of A&A’s misconstrual of the argument for 
EMH, a second question remains: is there anything left of A&A’s worries? That 
is, although A&A are wrong to accuse advocates of EMH of committing the 
coupling-constitution fallacy, is it nonetheless possible to extract a more 
legitimate worry from their writings about EMH? We think it is.  
When does coupling involve (what we will call) cognitive spread? 
Consider the case of Nat. One day, Nat decides to go bungee jumping. When Nat 
jumps off the platform, his body and the bungee cord form a tightly coupled 
system, since a proper understanding of the behavior of his body must make 
essential reference to the behavior of the cord, and vice versa. But none of Nat’s 
cognitive processes are spread throughout the bungee cord. The question raised by 
A&A is what, if anything, is the difference between Nat’s case and the cases of 
John (Haugeland) and Otto? That is, when does coupling X (something that 
sometimes functions as a self-contained cognitive system) and Y (something that, 
on its own, never functions as a self-contained cognitive system) make Z (a new 
cognitive system, one which is not merely another way of referring to X)? In 
short, under what conditions is cognition spread across a coupled system? What, 
if anything, distinguishes the coupling of Nat+cord from the coupling of 
Otto+notebook? 
 
3.1. What makes something a cognitive system? 
As Nat’s bungee cord case clearly illustrates, coupling need not imply 
cognitive spread. The most obvious way to address this worry is to identify what 
makes something a cognitive system in the first place. Following A&A, this is the 
strategy we propose to adopt:
18
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The bounds of cognition must be determined by finding the mark of the 
cognitive, then seeing what sorts of processes in the world have the mark.
 
(2001: 
46)
 
 
There are two aspects to this strategy: first, to identify a plausible mark of the 
mental; second, to see if this mark is spread throughout the tightly coupled 
systems discussed by Haugeland and C&C. Unlike A&A, we think that the most 
plausible such mark is, in fact, spread throughout these systems. 
 We agree with A&A that the most plausible mark of the mental is 
intentionality: the property of being about or directed toward something. Taking 
intentionality to be the mark of the mental arguably originates with Franz 
Brentano: 
 
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the 
Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and 
what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, 
direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a 
thing), or immanent objectivity. (Brentano, 1874/1995: 88–89) 
 
Taking intentionality to be the mark of the mental is contested, of course;
19
 it is 
enough for our purposes to note that it is the mark of the mental most often 
invoked as a way of criticizing EMH. That said, not just any sort of intentionality 
will do, if only because not all sorts of intentionality are sufficient for 
mindedness. Consider, for example, cases in which we explicitly stipulate that 
something has intentionality: for instance, we can stipulate that the shape ‘’ 
refers to the Empire State Building. Having done this, ‘’ now has intentionality, 
but that hardly suffices to show that it is minded. In order to identify the sort of 
intentionality that is sufficient for mindedness, it will help to draw a distinction 
between intentionality that is merely derivative—for it exists only in virtue of 
something else bestowing intentionality on it (as we have just done with the shape 
‘’)—and intentionality that is not derivative. As A&A and other critics of EMH 
note, the sort of intentionality that is needed to show that something is minded is 
this second sort of non-derivative, or original intentionality.
20
   
 Merely drawing a distinction between original and derivative 
intentionality and claiming that original intentionality is the mark of the mental is 
hardly sufficient for settling the debate between EMH and its critics, however. 
What is needed is a non-question begging characterization of what it is for a 
system to possess original intentionality, one that does not simply assume that 
Otto’s notebook—or anything else—either does or does not have original 
intentionality. What is it, for instance, for Otto’s CNS to possess original 
intentionality? What differentiates the intentionality possessed by Otto’s CNS 
from the intentionality possessed by ‘’? We think that it is necessary to answer 
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this question in order to respond to the legitimate worry raised by A&A, the 
question of when, exactly, cognition is spread across a tightly coupled system. 
 
 
3.2. Semantic Activity 
What is the mark of original intentionality? It will not do simply to point 
to examples of systems that possess original intentionality, such as the CNS, if 
only because the debate over EMH is about whether things other than the CNS 
can possess original intentionality.
21
 We think a good starting point for identifying 
the mark of original intentionality lies in a characteristic pattern of activity that 
Haugeland calls ‘semantic activity’. Haugeland introduces the idea of semantic 
activity by reflecting upon the following difference between printed words that 
possess mere derivative intentionality (such as the ‘’) and brain states in the 
CNS that possess original intentionality. He writes: 
 
The most conspicuous difference between book symbols (printed words) and 
brain symbols (thoughts) is that book symbols just sit there, doing nothing, 
while thoughts are constantly interacting and changing. But that by itself can’t 
be the crucial difference, since book-like symbols can also be interactive and 
variable. Imagine printing individual word tokens on thousands of tiny floating 
magnets or on the backs of busy ants. The resulting physical symbols would 
interact vigorously and form various amusing combinations; but their meaning 
would still be just as derivative (from us) as those of any lines inked quietly on a 
page. 
Nevertheless, this may be on the right track. Consider writing the 
following premises on a piece of paper: 
 
 All frogs eat insects. 
 Fido is a frog. 
 
Nothing much happens. More revealing: if we set them out on magnets or ants, 
then plenty of activity might ensue, but most likely nothing interesting about 
frogs or insects. In sum, the behavior of such symbols (independent of our 
manipulations) is quite unrelated to what they mean. By contrast, if we got those 
premises into somebody’s head (say, in the form of beliefs), then a new complex 
symbol would very likely appear—and not just any new symbol, but specifically 
a valid conclusion about Fido and insect eating: 
 
  Fido eats insects. 
 
So the important difference is not merely that thoughts are active, but 
that their activity is directly related to their meanings; in general, the changes 
and interactions among thought symbols are semantically appropriate. 
Accordingly, I say that thought symbols are semantically active, in 
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contradistinction to printed or magnetic symbols, which are semantically inert 
(even if they’re ‘active’ in other ways that are semantically irrelevant). (1985: 
120-1)  
 
Haugeland’s proposal is that systems that have original intentionality 
exhibit semantic activity; systems that have mere derivative intentionality exhibit 
intentionality, but are not semantically active. The proposal is attractive because it 
captures the intuition that things with original intentionality are ‘active’ in a way 
that things with derivative intentionality are not (and it does so without simply 
assuming that brain states have original intentionality because they are brain 
states). 
Alas, there is a problem with this proposal. Calculators are semantically 
active and yet it is implausible to think that they have original intentionality. 
Thus, this proposal seems in need of qualification. Not just any semantic activity 
is sufficient for original intentionality. 
 What more is needed for original intentionality?  
 
3.3. Giving a Damn 
In this section, we propose an account of the sort of semantic activity that 
suffices for original intentionality. Our proposal is controversial. We fully expect 
that philosophers who find EMH counter-intuitive will find our proposal just as 
counterintuitive. That said, our proposal is not without precedent. Broadly 
speaking, it can be located in the tradition of thinkers who claim that a distinctive 
sort of behavioral flexibility is required for genuine thought.
22
 We propose that a 
system must give a damn about its semantic activity for that activity to exhibit 
original intentionality.
23
 More precisely—drawing on another of Haugeland’s 
ideas—we argue that a system must take responsibility for the proper functioning 
of its semantic activity for that semantic activity to exhibit original intentionality.  
 This section has two parts. First, we explain what sort of responsibility is 
required for original intentionality. Second, we argue that this sort of 
responsibility is exhibited by the Otto+notebook system but not by the Nat+cord 
system. We will thus provide an answer to the question that opened §3: what, 
exactly, is the difference between these two systems, such that cognition spreads 
in one but does not spread in the other? 
 Our proposal is that a system must take responsibility for the proper 
functioning of its semantic activity for that semantic activity to exhibit original 
intentionality. By this, we mean that it must be critical of its semantic activity. 
There are three levels to such self-criticism. We will talk about each in turn.
24
 
 The first level of self-criticism concerns the active manipulation of 
semantic items (e.g. beliefs, desires, etc.). A system with original intentionality 
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must abide by norms for producing, manipulating, and removing these semantic 
items. For instance, cognitive systems should reject beliefs that it discovers to be 
false. Suppose Otto believes there is cereal in the cupboard, but opens it and sees 
that there is not any there; all else being equal, he should now reject his belief that 
there is cereal in the cupboard.
25
 The ‘should’ here is not merely alethic but 
normative. That is, it does not concern merely what a system does or is disposed 
to do, but what that system ought to do—if it is to function properly at all. For 
instance, Otto might not actually give up his belief about the cereal, but he ought 
to give it up on pain of diminished cognitive functioning.  
 Of course, it is natural to wonder which norms a system should follow. 
This points to a second level of self-criticism. A system with original 
intentionality must scrutinize its own norms for modifying the semantic items in 
that system. So, not only must such a system modify semantic items in 
accordance with its norms, it must also modify, where appropriate, those norms 
themselves. The idea is that a system should reject norms that do not work, and 
adopt norms that do. For instance, Otto might realize that beliefs he forms while 
drunk tend to be unreliable; he might then adopt a norm of questioning or simply 
rejecting beliefs identified as such. (Such a realization or such an adoption need 
not be conscious.)  
What shows whether a norm works? As with the first level of self-
criticism, the choice of norms is, by-and-large, determined by the role they play in 
making possible skillful coping with the world. Intuitively, we can say that a 
norm works if compliance with it tends to result in semantic items that allow for 
such skillful coping, e.g. true beliefs, good desires, etc.
26
 In that respect, a system 
with original intentionality aims for its success at coping with worldly affairs to 
be non-accidental. Such success is what is at stake in second-order self-criticism. 
That is, a system with original intentionality ought to scrutinize its norms because 
it aims at non-accidental success. Norms should be revised so as to satisfy that 
goal. That points us to a third level of self-criticism.  
 At bottom, a system with original intentionality must care (i.e., give a 
damn) about getting things right.
27
 Such care is apparent in the first two levels of 
self-criticism, but it is clearest in the third level of self-criticism. A system with 
original intentionality must be prepared to give up its whole way of doing things 
if it realizes that success at the second level was merely accidental. That is, it must 
be prepared to recognize that despite its best efforts to adjust its norms in the light 
of errors, it is unable to come up with norms that really work, norms that can be 
relied upon to get things right. To give up one’s whole way of doing things 
involves more than rejecting individual norms governing one’s semantic activity. 
Rather, it involves abandoning those norms that are definitive of the system’s way 
of engaging in semantic activity as such.
28
 The rejection of those norms (and the 
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potential adoption of others) is so radical as to constitute an end to the system’s 
old way of engaging in cognitive activity. In that sense, it is like death (and 
potential rebirth). Thus, good examples of this sort of giving up are cases in which 
a scientist abandons her existing scientific practice altogether, usually in favor of 
another: e.g., Copernicus’s abandonment of Ptolemaic theory. Copernicus was 
well aware that Ptolemaic theory was capable of making accurate predictions of 
the future behavior of heavenly objects. But he came to think that the very project 
of trying to explain the moon’s, planets’, and sun’s behavior in a shared fashion 
was mistaken, that the success of the Ptolemaic model in this regard was merely 
accidental and did not represent a reliable system of norms for getting things 
right. This is a paradigmatic instance of the third level of self-criticism. 
In sum, there are three levels of self-criticism in which a system must 
engage to exhibit original intentionality, all of which are anchored in caring about 
getting things right: 
 
First level: produce and reject semantic items in accord with norms for proper 
production and rejection; 
Second level: produce and reject those very norms, where appropriate; 
Third level: give up the whole system of norms in favor of some other. 
What remains to be shown is how the tightly coupled system of Otto+notebook 
exhibit all three levels of self-criticism, and thus counts as a system with original 
intentionality. 
 Imagine that Otto desires to visit the Museum of Modern Art. He looks in 
his notebook and sees this:  
 
  MOMA: 11 East 53rd St. 
 
He goes to that address, but sees that the Museum of Modern Art is not there. He 
should—and presumably will—question the accuracy of what is written in his 
notebook. He might not immediately erase it; he might put a question mark by it. 
He might say aloud, ‘What’s wrong with this address? Is this the right street, but 
the wrong number? Is this the wrong street? Are both the number and the street 
wrong?’ He looks at his notebook again, and sees this: 
 
  MOMA Phone: (212) 708-9400  
  
He calls the number and asks what the address is. They tell him it is 11 West 53
rd
 
St. At this point, he erases ‘East’ and replaces it with ‘West’. This illustrates the 
first level of self-criticism.  
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 Now, imagine that Otto has gotten drunk several times in the past few 
weeks. Each subsequent morning, he has found information in his notebook that 
eventually leads him astray. On one occasion, he had the wrong name for a new 
acquaintance; on another, he listed a Mexican restaurant as recommended when 
he had been warned against it; on yet another, he listed himself as having plans 
for a date that he wanted to have but that he had not actually planned. Having 
been repeatedly led astray by such information, he eventually recognizes a 
pattern. The information he records when drunk is unreliable. He should do 
something. But what, exactly, should he do? Should he stop drinking? Should he 
stop recording notes while drunk? Should he be especially attentive when 
recording notes while drunk? These are the sorts of question that should arise as 
he contemplates what would be the best way for him to get notes that are more 
consistently accurate or true. Suppose he decides to be more attentive when 
recording notes while drunk, but it does not work. He finds that the pattern 
persists: even when more attentive, the notes are consistently inaccurate. He will 
then have to try something else. Whatever exact policy he settles on, his attempt 
to find one that works (or works better) illustrates the second level of self-
criticism. 
  Now, imagine that there are more persistent and widespread problems. 
Suppose that Otto develops Parkinsons’s Disease, and with it regular, intense 
hand tremors. They make it very hard for Otto to write. Not only is it unpleasant 
for him to do so but what he writes is illegible, even to him. Unlike the notes 
written while drunk, this problem is not localized, but pervasive, for the tremors 
occur regularly. Moreover, despite consultations with specialists, the tremors 
cannot be brought under control. In such a situation, Otto might well abandon the 
use of the notebook altogether, even if he does not have some other, more reliable, 
method of remembering information. This is an example of the third level of self-
criticism, since it involves giving up being a certain sort of person, one who 
records memories in a notebook. 
 Now contrast the cases of Otto+notebook and Nat+cord. The difference 
that makes a difference (for our purposes) is that only the notebook exhibits the 
right sort of semantic activity. Consider the following three differences between 
Otto’s notebook and Nat’s bungee cord. First, neither the bungee cord nor 
anything on it represents anything. The notebook is full of semantic items: the 
writing in it represents names, locations, times, etc. Thus, the notebook is 
plausibly a site of intentionality—whether it is derivative or original is a separate 
issue. Second, since the cord does not represent anything, there is certainly no 
semantic activity there. The semantic items in the notebook, however, are 
semantically active; they change according to their meanings.
29
 Now, such 
activity by itself does not suffice for original intentionality; the activity has to be 
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of the right sort, which leads us to the third and most important difference. Since 
there is no semantic activity in the cord, Nat+cord cannot engage in self-criticism 
of such activity.
30
 However, as we have just seen, Otto+notebook does take 
responsibility for the semantic activity in the notebook. That suggests that the 
notebook is not just a site of intentionality, but of original intentionality. The 
notebook is not merely an optional device for recording the results of semantic 
activity that originally takes place somewhere else. Rather, it is where that 
semantic activity originally takes place. As such, it is a constitutive part of a 
system that exhibits original intentionality.
31
 
 It is tempting to retort that Otto+notebook as a whole does not take 
responsibility for the semantic activity in the notebook; Otto’s body does all of 
the work. In a trivial sense, this allegation is true: Otto’s body writes in the 
notebook; the notebook does not write on Otto’s body. But, in a more substantial 
sense, the allegation is either false or irrelevant. The allegation is false if it is 
supposed to mean that the notebook does not play an essential role in the behavior 
of the system as a whole. Consider the case of Inga, who has brain-bound 
memories of MOMA’s address. Just as Inga’s memories determine where she 
looks for MOMA, the contents of Otto’s notebook determine where he looks for 
it. Likewise, just as Inga should revise her memory if she does not find MOMA 
where her memory says it is, so Otto should revise his notebook if he does not 
find MOMA where his notebook says it is. Neither Inga nor Otto would be able to 
find the museum if these parts of their cognitive systems malfunctioned. (They 
are, in this sense, functionally equivalent.) The allegation is irrelevant if it is 
supposed to mean that Otto’s notebook does not, by itself, take responsibility for 
the proper functioning of the system. By parity of reasoning, if every part of our 
minds had to take responsibility for the proper functioning of the whole, then 
Inga’s memories would not count as part of her mind!32 
 
4. Conclusion 
 This paper has three goals. First, to offer a perspicuous account of the 
main argument for EMH and to identify the most prominent objection to it. 
Second, to undermine this objection, not just by showing that it misconstrues the 
main argument for EMH but also by diagnosing the source of this misconstrual. 
Third, to point the way forward for EMH by outlining a view of the nature of 
cognitive systems that explains what makes cognitive spread possible.  
 If there is one point to take away from this paper, it is that previous 
discussions of EMH (both by advocates and detractors) have not adequately 
explored the nature of original intentionality. They have tended to rest content 
with an intuitive understanding of it as the mark of the mental, treating it as 
whatever it is that our unembedded bodies do when they think about things. But 
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that idea leaves it utterly opaque under what conditions original intentionality—
cognition—might extend beyond our bodies. We have begun to correct that 
opacity, trying to explain what original intentionality consists in and under what 
conditions it can extend beyond the human body. Of course, we have offered only 
a sketch, one that deserves to be extended.
33
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NOTES
                                                 
 
1
 For instance: (Haugeland, 1995), (Clark, 1997), (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) (Clark, 
2008), (Hurley, 1998), (Rowlands, 1999), (Noe, 2004), (Wilson R. , 2004), (Shapiro, 2011). 
 
2
 For instance: (Adams & Aizawa, 2001), (Grush, 2003), (Rupert, 2004), and (Fodor, 
2009). 
 
3
 For instance: (Adams & Aizawa, 2001), (Adams & Aizawa, 2008) (Adams & Aizawa, 
2010a), and (Adams & Aizawa, 2010b). 
4
 For instance: (Fisher, 2009), (Walter & Kyselo, 2009), (Wilson R. A., 2010). 
5
 Clark may be the most prominent advocate of EMH, but he clearly acknowledges the 
influence of (Haugeland, 1995) on his view. See (Clark, 2008a: 37-38); (Clark, 2008b: xxvi-
xxvii). 
 
6
 Clark credits (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) as the earliest argument for EMH. 
But they argue for embodied cognition, not extended cognition. The argument for EMH outlined 
here, in terms of general principles of systems analysis and the functional equivalence of external 
worldly items and inner mental representations, is first clearly articulated in (Haugeland, 1995). 
That said, it is a mug’s game to try to identify the origin of a philosophical idea or argument. As 
Haugeland himself emphasizes, there is a long history to all of the component parts of (what we 
are calling) the master argument for EMH. Haugeland merely combines these parts in a new and 
novel manner. 
 
7
 For a different account of the difference between constituents and causal influences, see 
(Shapiro, 2011: 159-160).  
8
 Haugeland uses ‘functional equivalence’ at (1995: 213). 
 
9
 Haugeland does not seem interested in the question of whose mind the road to San Jose 
is part of; that is, he appears to think that it is a mistake to ask about the boundary conditions of 
individual minds (e.g., as a way of individuating them). To us, this seems like a sensible 
conclusion to draw from EMH, though it has not—to our knowledge—been noted by subsequent 
advocates (or detractors) of EMH. Perhaps Descartes’ most lasting legacy will be the persistence 
of the assumption that your mind is your mind—that it is uniquely and solely yours. 
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10
 In the words of A&A, ‘It simply does not follow from the fact that process X is in 
some way causally connected to a cognitive process that X is thereby part of that cognitive 
process’ (2008: 91). Elsewhere, they write, ‘the fact that object or process X is coupled to object 
or process Y does not entail that X is part of Y’ (2010a: 68). 
11
 The classic discussion of the significance of the Watt steam engine governor for EMH 
is (Van Gelder, 1995). 
12
 Image by John Haugeland. From (Van Gelder, 2007: 425). 
13
 Indeed, as A&A note, the most common response to their discussion of the coupling-
constitution fallacy is simply ‘to say that no one really commits it’ (Adams & Aizawa, 2010b). In 
fact, examples in which X being tightly coupled to Y implies that X is part of Y are comparatively 
rare: chains and trains are some of the few examples. We are indebted to Justin Horn for these 
examples 
 
14
 To be clear: we are not claiming that high-bandwidth interaction is identical to 
functional equivalence. We are claiming that sameness of high-bandwidth interaction is sufficient 
for being functionally equivalent to a part of a cognitive system. It is not the only way of 
achieving functional equivalence. Nor is it necessary for functional equivalence. As such, they are 
not identical. Thanks to an anonymous referee of this journal for indicating that we should be 
explicit about this. 
15
 (Adams & Aizawa, 2010a: 67). When proponents of EMH say that the mind extends to 
worldly items like iPhones and notebooks, they are not claiming that those items think. Rather, 
they are claiming that those items are parts of cognitive processes or systems, larger wholes that 
think. Just as memories and internal maps themselves do not think, iPhones and notebooks 
themselves do not think. 
16
 Multi-digit multiplication is thus similar to the case of the Watt steam engine governor, 
in which making sense of the behavior of the flyballs necessarily involves making reference to the 
behavior of the throttle valve, and vice versa. 
17
 It is worth noting that the mistake A&A make here is parallel to the mistake made by 
(Searle, 1980). Searle assumes that because he himself sometimes functions as a self-contained 
cognitive system (e.g., when he is speaking English), he must always function as such (e.g., when 
he is part of a system capable of speaking Chinese). As a general pattern of inference, this is rather 
obviously fallacious: a particular brigade may function as a self-contained unit in some battles but 
not in others. See (Haugeland, 1990) and (Haugeland, 2002b).  
 
18
 For the sake of argument, we follow A&A in adopting the strategy that they propose 
for setting the debate between advocates of EMH and their critics. But we think this strategy 
exhibits a troublesome indifference to distinctions between parts and wholes in A&A’s 
discussions of EMH. A better, but more difficult, strategy would be to identity the features that 
make inner memories (for instance) parts of cognitive systems and then look to see if there are any 
external items (such as the contents of Otto’s notebook) that exhibit these same features. The 
problem with A&A’s strategy is that the features that make something a whole cognitive system 
need not be possessed by any (let alone all) of its parts. 
 
19
 For a useful summary of debates on the question of whether intentionality is the mark 
of the mental, see (Crane, 1998). 
 
20
 A&A write, ‘A[n] essential condition on the cognitive is that cognitive states must 
involve intrinsic, non-derived content’ (2001: 48). Another prominent critic of EMH, Jerry Fodor, 
writes, ‘‘Underived’ content (to borrow John Searle’s term) is the mark of the mental; underived 
content is what minds and only minds have’ (Fodor, 2009). ‘Underived’ content is not, in fact, 
Searle’s term but Haugeland’s. As footnote 6 in (Haugeland, 1990) painstakingly details, in the 
late 1970s both Haugeland and Searle introduced similar but non-equivalent distinctions between 
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different types of intentionality. Haugeland’s distinction was between original and derivative 
intentionality, where ‘original’ simply means ‘non-derivative’; Searle’s distinction was between 
intrinsic and observer-relative intentionality, where ‘intrinsic’ means something much more than 
‘non-derivative’—it means (something like) ‘a causal consequence of the 
physical/chemical/biological structure of the brain’. It seems clear that Fodor means to be 
invoking Haugeland’s distinction, not Searle’s. The confusion is understandable, insofar as in 
more recent writings Searle has (by-and-large) adopted Haugeland’s distinction, thereby 
abandoning the distinction he himself introduced to the literature. 
21
 It is worth noting that critics of EMH rarely make any effort to explain what it is for 
something (such as the CNS) to possess original intentionality. They appear to simply take it for 
granted that the CNS possesses original intentionality, without in any way offering an explanation 
for why this might be the case. 
22
 For instance: (Sellars, 1956), (Bennett, 1964), and (Sterelny, 2003). 
 
23
 Haugeland wrote, ‘The trouble with artificial intelligence is that computers don’t give a 
damn’ (1979: 619). 
 
24
 Our account of these three levels of self-criticism is drawn from (Haugeland, 2002a). 
 
25
 This first level of self-criticism can get quite complicated. As Duhem and Quine have 
emphasized, there are cases in which it is not obvious which of two incompatible beliefs must be 
given up; either or both could be given up, given the possibility of broader revisions in one’s 
beliefs about the world. 
 
26
 As with the first level of self-criticism, identifying which norms work can get quite 
complicated. If one finds oneself regularly forming false beliefs it is sometimes not obvious which 
norms are to blame.  
 
27
 The most detailed account of what it would be for a system to exhibit this third level of 
self-criticism is given in (Haugeland, 1998). 
 
28
 As before, it is sometimes not obvious which norms those will be. 
29
 It is worth noting that this makes Otto’s notebook manifestly unlike most normal books 
or notebooks. Whether a particular string of text exhibits original or derivative intentionality is, we 
think, a question of how it behaves. 
30
 At this point, more radical advocates of EMH might be inclined to say that we have not 
identified a relevant difference between Otto+notebook and Nat+cord, because on an expanded 
understanding of cognition, cognition is equally well spread throughout both such cases. After all, 
the length of the bungee cord should depend on how high the platform is from the ground and this 
length should be revised if it is too long or too short. We do not mean to dispute such a view; we 
only mean to dispute the view held by critics of EMH, according to which neither Otto+notebook 
nor Nat+bungee cord exhibit cognitive spread. If it helps to see what we take to be especially 
distinctive about Otto’s case, contrast it with the (slightly ridiculous) imaginary case of Ben, who 
trips, falls off a cliff, and unintentionally wraps his leg around a loose vine, thereby creating a 
tightly coupled bungee-cord-like system, albeit one that is in no way the result of intentional 
human activity. Such a system does not exhibit cognitive spread of any sort. We take it to be 
importantly different from the Otto+notebook case in this regard. 
31
 We think that Haugeland’s example of the road to San Jose is similar to Otto’s 
notebook in this regard. The key is to recognize that minds need not belong exclusively to 
individual human bodies. They can also belong to social entities, such as cities. It is some such 
larger social entity that takes responsibility for the proper functioning of the road in representing 
the way to San Jose. See (Haugeland, 1982). 
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32
 That said, we do think it is an important, outstanding problem (as noted in fn. 18 
above) how to characterize the different contributions that different parts of cognitive systems 
make for the proper functioning of cognitive systems as wholes.  
33
 For comments on previous drafts, we are grateful to Jake Browning, Nat Hansen, Eliot 
Michaelson, and Tyke Nunez.  
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